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Abstract
Grounded in the agency, socioemotional wealth and resource dependence the-
ories, we study how debt decisions are influenced by family control and how
such relationship is moderated by an internal corporate governance mecha-
nism, the quality of the board of directors. Our results show that family-con-
trolled firms use more leverage at lower levels of family ownership to retain
family control over the business, but once their socioemotional wealth is ful-
filled at higher levels of ownership, they decrease leverage in pursuit of conser-
vative financing policies. These actions are found to be moderated by board
quality (i.e., experience and expertise) and female directors (predominantly
independent).
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Financing decisions relate to the firm's credit risk and,
therefore, impact on the probability of corporate failure.
Thus, it is key to understand the influence that certain
types of shareholders exert on these decisions, as well as
the mediating effect of corporate governance practices.
Of particular relevance is the case of family owners who
become risk-seeking influenced by the threat of losing
their socioemotional wealth (SEW), favouring the
increase in debt over the loss of equity (Keasey, Martinez,
& Pindado, 2015). Therefore, it is their loss aversion
rather than their risk aversion that influences their
financing decisions. Once the family's SEW is fully
reached (gain frame), they may follow a conservative
attitude towards debt, reducing the probability of
bankruptcy.
Schmid (2013) shows that the maintenance of control
is very important to founders and their families, which
directly influences the use of leverage. Therefore, given
the particular non-economic characteristics that influ-
ence family members' decisions in a company, firms
should count for corporate mechanisms that control
these decisions, dismissing the firms' probability to fail
and maximizing firm's value. In this sense, the composi-
tion and characteristics of boards of directors have been
central to the debate that revolves around effective corpo-
rate governance mechanisms to reduce agency problems
in the corporation as described by Jensen and
Meckling (1976). In light of the wave of accounting scan-
dals, the importance of the monitoring and advising role
of the board of directors has been stressed (Adams &
Ferreira, 2009). Hence, directors' experience (Hillman &
Dalziel, 2003; Kroll, Walters, & Wright, 2008), connec-
tions (Horton, Millo, & Serafeim, 2012), risk preferences
(Ferrero-Ferrero, Fernández-Izquierdo, & Muñoz-
Torres, 2012) and affiliations (Anderson & Reeb, 2004;
Westphal, 1999) become relevant when overseeing
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corporate financial decisions that will serve in the inter-
est of shareholders.
On the basis that equity holding is a proxy for the pre-
disposition to dilute control, in this paper we hypothesize
that family firms prefer to finance with debt up to the
point where the threat of losing control is decreased (qua-
dratic effect). We model such relationship using the char-
acteristics of the board of directors as mediators of
leverage decisions, particularly considering that family
affiliation may impede directors' advisory role. Family
firms benefit from board monitoring since the control
function of the board protects the interest of non-family
shareholders. Previous literature has found that boards of
directors are significant in explaining differences in the
way firms function and how they perform (Adams,
Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010; Khan, Al-Jabri, &
Saif, 2019) and their effect on firm's reputation
(Brammer, Millington, & Pavelin, 2009), highlighting the
importance of the role of board of directors not only as
monitors of management (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2001)
but also as strategists to the selection of projects (Domi-
nguez-Martinez, Swank, & Visser, 2008) such as, promot-
ing strategic initiatives and taking strategic decisions
(Minichilli, Zattoni, & Zona, 2009). Thus, the relevance
of boards of directors in a corporation can be rationalized
not only with agency theory but also in complement with
resource dependence theory (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).
That is, efficient boards decrease agency costs by reduc-
ing the expropriation of resources through monitoring
but also require the relevant experience in advising
management effectively (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001;
Valenti & Horner, 2020). Our study seeks to reconcile
these perspectives in our theoretical framework to assess
the moderating effect of the board of directors over
actions from family-controllers. In this sense, we antici-
pate that boards play a role in setting corporate strate-
gies (i.e., level of leverage) and provide imperative
resources to the firm, such as fostering networks and
connections (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009)
and quality in the decisions made (Ferris, Jagannathan,
& Pritchard, 2003).
Our research framework incorporates developments
in the family business literature stressing the impact of
social structures and social relationships on the behav-
iour of family firms. We test whether family firms are
averse to dilute their control stake resulting in an
increased leverage. To this end, we consider that the ben-
efits of control might result from both having a large
shareholding and holding a position in the board. Herein,
we analyse the quadratic relationship between family
ownership and leverage to test whether the family's lever-
age preferences change at different levels of ownership as
a result of SEW incentives (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes,
Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007).
Then, we consider boards' quality and gender diversity as
corporate governance mechanisms that moderate the
non-linear relationship between family control and lever-
age, considering that the influence of social relationships
on family firms differ to those of non-family firms
because of the controlling family's organizational and
relational embeddedness in the firm (Bird &
Zellweger, 2018). Finally, we observe that boards are
endogenous because economic actors select them in
response to financial and governance matters in the cor-
poration (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2001). Therefore, our
estimations are robust with the application of the system
GMM, that, as explained by Khan et al. (2019), helps to
control the autocorrelation, the heteroscedasticity and
the issue of endogeneity.
Our research design captures firm ownership struc-
ture and corporate governance practices across countries
by examining individual firms. To test our hypotheses,
we employ data from six Latin American countries,
which represent the largest stock markets of the region:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru
(187 non-financial firms and 1,108 observations over the
period of 2005–2016). The Latin American corporate mar-
ket is relevant for this research for various reasons. First,
it is characterized by family control and a weak legal pro-
tection (Castro, Brown, & Báez-Díaz, 2009; La Porta,
Lopez de Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999), which exacerbates
the family opportunities for expropriation of resources
(through self-benefiting decisions) and stresses the
importance of internal corporate governance mecha-
nisms to protect minority investors (i.e., board quality
and composition). Second, specific institutional and cul-
tural contexts are crucial to understand the impact of cor-
porate governance (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Husted &
de Sousa-Filho, 2019). Therefore, the “culture” of the
region is relevant for the development of the analytical
framework through the inclusion of the socioemotional
wealth theory. Third, as studies based on USA or other
developed economies do not apply to all regions, research
on smaller markets is vital for the advancement of
knowledge where is most needed. Therefore, as advo-
cated by Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera (2016) and more
recently by Gómez-Mejía, Basco, González, and
Muller (2020), we further empirical evidence where
research has been limited to study the relationship
between family firms, the quality of the board and lever-
age. Our main findings show that family-controlled firms
take more leverage as a financing decision. Such position
changes at higher levels of family ownership, where the
family's SEW is rich enough, and therefore leverage is
decreased allowing for other more optimal sources of
financing. In addition, we find support for the
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moderating role of board of directors' quality as an effec-
tive corporate governance mechanism to maximize firms'
wealth. In particular, more qualified and independent
female directors balance family firms' preferences,
inversely moderating the positive effect of family-con-
trolled firms on leverage at lower levels of ownership,
and vice versa at higher levels of family ownership.
We contribute to the current state of the art on family
ownership and the role of an effective and gender diverse
board in several ways. First, based on the SEW perspec-
tive, we tailor the willingness of family owners to take
leverage at different levels of ownership that reflects
whether the family's SEW is above or below the referent
point. While previous research has studied the connec-
tion between family firms and leverage (Keasey
et al., 2015), we further our analysis based on the non-
financial motives of family firms (i.e., preserve family
control) incentivized by their corporate ownership, indi-
cating a non-linear relationship between leverage and
family ownership. In addition, while Schmid (2013) and
Chen, Dasgupta, and Yu (2014) focus on the role played
by external corporate governance mechanisms in the cap-
ital structure of family firms, such as creditor monitoring
and analyst coverage, respectively, we rely on the role
played by the quality of the board of directors as an inter-
nal corporate governance mechanism. This extends the
work of González et al. (2013) that delves into the family
fear for losing control, which leads to higher debt levels,
by providing an understanding on the internal mecha-
nisms that can be useful to alleviate this fear and there-
fore, reduce leverage.
Second, we integrate the agency and resource depen-
dence theories that explain the monitoring and advisory
role of the board of directors, respectively. Both roles are
needed for the effectiveness of the board as a good corpo-
rate governance mechanism that, in our context, its qual-
ity moderates the preferences of family firms for leverage,
looking for the optimal level that allows firm's value max-
imization. Therefore, our analysis highlights that the
quality of the board that encompasses monitoring and
advising abilities enhances a board's decision-making
process aligning board decisions and firm's outcomes
(Güner, Malmendier, & Tate, 2008). Third, in light of
Poletti-Hughes and Briano-Turrent (2019), we distinguish
the role of female directors in the theory of boards of
directors in family firms. That is, the power and legiti-
macy motives of family-affiliated-female directors and
independent female directors influence their ability and
efficacy for decision-making in the boardroom (Cruz,
Justo, Larraza-Kintana, & Garcés-Galdeano, 2019).
Therefore, we fill a gap in the knowledge and integrate
the literature of gender diversity and the pivotal role of
inside and outside directors' roles in the boardroom by
considering that the heterogeneity of female directors is
relevant to regulate corporate decisions in family firms
(i.e., non-optimal leverage).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the
next section we explain our theoretical background and
hypotheses. Second, we present the methodology. Third,
we show the main results. Fourth, a conclusion and dis-
cussion section is presented. Finally, the last section con-
tains some practical implications.
2 | THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
DEVELOPMENT
2.1 | Leverage in family firms
Businesses have two main sources of financing: debt and
equity. In a public company, the source of financing that
represents the highest loss of control to the firm's share-
holders is the issue of equity, since it leads to the dilution
of their ownership. Thus, firms that are more averse to
lose their control will prefer to be more leveraged. In this
setting, financing firm's operations through debt as
opposed to equity because of self-interest reasons is a way
of expropriation of minority shareholders, which is pre-
dominant when there is separation of ownership and
control (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).
Family firms might use more debt than non-family
firms with the purpose of growing the firm without dilut-
ing their ownership (Croci, Doukas, & Gonenc, 2011;
Setia-Atmaja, Tanewski, & Skully, 2009). The aversion to
lose control accentuates with SEW incentives. That is,
family firms tolerate a loss in financial performance to
achieve non-financial aims, such as the preservation of
family control over the firm (Gómez-Mejía, Cruz,
Berrone, & De Castro, 2011). Family businesses are less
willing to dilute their ownership, which leads to a higher
leverage, for several reasons. First, family firms usually
invest their personal wealth in the business, thus they
have an emotional connection that make family mem-
bers have a longer horizon (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, &
Scholnick, 2008) compared to other shareholders (e.g.,
institutional investors) and lead them to the desire of
maintaining the family legacy over time. Second, family
firms have greater psychological ownership (Liu, Wang,
Hui, & Lee, 2012) and socioemotional endowment
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007) than non-family firms, given
their greater involvement, self-investment and knowl-
edge over the firm. Third, family firms differentiate from
non-family firms in their shareholder composition. Fam-
ily companies represent a unique class of shareholders
with undiversified portfolios (Anderson, Mansi, &
Reeb, 2003) leading the family to higher commitment to
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the company. Finally, family firms are characterized by
the existence of dual-class stock and pyramidal owner-
ship structures (Villalonga & Amit, 2010), which create a
divergence between cash flow and voting rights and
increases the power of the family to obtain its personal
goals. Thus, the aversion to forfeit control (Mishra &
McConaughy, 1999) relates to the commitment of the
family to the business.
Family businesses can use their control position to
pursue their own objectives, such as the appointment of a
family member in a top management position, increase
of their salary, diversion of resources to the family, con-
tinuation of the family legacy, etc. To maintain the family
legacy, the family may be reluctant to dilute their owner-
ship and use debt as their main source of financing.
Long-term relationships and close ties of the controlling
family with banks might also facilitate access to low cost
of debt (Anderson et al., 2003). Family shareholders are
characterized by connectedness and cohesiveness which
impulses the collectivist as opposed to the individualist
values (Falicov, 2001). The commune actions from family
members centralizes control and limits negotiation with
minority investors (Schneider, 2009), which consequen-
tially aggravates the optimization of financing decisions
in detriment of the firm's wealth maximization.
Hypothesis 1 Family control has a positive effect on
leverage.
Companies with controlling shareholders with rela-
tively small ownership have lower willingness to dilute
control with the issue of equity, given their high commit-
ment to the firm, as explained by the “non-dilution
entrenchment effect” (Du & Dai, 2005). Under the SEW
framework, the alternative of issuing debt versus equity
depends on the preservation of firms' control in the fam-
ily (Gómez-Mejía, Makri, & Kintana, 2010). Therefore, it
follows that family-controlled firms with large ownership
might choose financing decisions differently (Du &
Dai, 2005), as the objectives of wealth maximization of
the family and those of the firm align towards achieving
an effective organizational structure (Anderson &
Reeb, 2003). When the threat of losing control has been
overcome through a large ownership stake (gain frame),
family owners become conservative towards debt by issu-
ing equity as it decreases the likelihood of financial dis-
tress (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999) and avoids bank
scrutiny that disciplines borrowing through liquidation
or renegotiation of loan contract terms (Fama &
Jensen, 1983). Therefore, the incentives of family-con-
trolled firms to use leverage reduce as ownership
increases. This suggests a non-linear relationship
between family ownership and leverage which intersects
once the family moves from the loss to the gain frame.
That is, family shareholders become less risk-seeking
(lower leverage) when operating in a gain frame (when
their desire level of SEW is above the reference level),
leading to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 There is an inverted U-shape relationship
of family ownership and leverage.
2.2 | The board of directors as a
moderator of financing decisions in family
firms
The increase in leverage for non-economical rather than
optimal reasons that arises when family firms are loss
averse intensifies the agency problem between majority
and minority shareholders. The family business main-
tains higher leverage for self-interest reasons if three con-
ditions hold: i) a motivation to issue debt instead of
equity; ii) good access to debt; and iii) power to execute
family decisions. The first and the second condition hold,
as a result of the incentives of family business to main-
tain their stake in the business, and their access to debt
at lower costs (Anderson et al., 2003; Pindado, Requejo,
& de La Torre, 2015). However, the power of the family
to expropriate minority shareholders and deviate from
the optimal policy could be limited with effective corpo-
rate governance mechanisms (Boubaker, Nguyen, &
Rouatbi, 2016).
The board of directors is one of the most useful inter-
nal corporate governance mechanisms (Denis &
McConnell, 2003) to control the actions of the dominant
shareholders, which in turn might reduce agency con-
flicts between minority and majority shareholders. There-
fore, the relevance of the board of directors in
strengthening the governance structure (Adams
et al., 2010) is evident as a solution to discipline the
actions of family-controllers.
2.2.1 | Board experience and expertise
(directors' quality)
Resource dependence theory contends that the provision
of resources is a function of board capital (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978). Directors have different backgrounds
that contribute to the value of their input in boards
including both human and relational capital through
their experience, education, reputation, expertise and
networks (DeFond, Hann, & Hu, 2005; Ferris et al., 2003;
Güner et al., 2008). The integration of agency and
resource dependence theory is important since inside
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directors may align their role to the family aims of
retaining firms' control while outside directors might out-
source the value of their human capital (Hillman &
Dalziel, 2003). In other words, according to resource
dependence theory, board capital is enhanced by boards'
ability to monitor as opposed to boards' incentives to
monitor. Therefore, by considering that both theories
interact together, board capital is likely to moderate
financing decisions in family firms as it impacts on both
monitoring and the provision of resources.
Since directors' role is to safeguard shareholders'
wealth, it follows that the integrity and quality of the
directors is relevant to achieve an effective outcome in
parallel with other aspects such as CEOs' influence and
corporate ownership (Fairchild & Li, 2005). Literature
has highlighted that directors' reputation signals quality,
which is intrinsically indicated by directors' experience
and connectedness (Ferris et al., 2003; Keys & Li, 2005).
Likewise, multiple board appointments have been reg-
arded as an indicator of directors' quality as serving on
multiple board increases directors' experience (Fama &
Jensen, 1983; Masulis & Mobbs, 2011). Hence the value
of board capital is increased because of the link between
directorships and experience.
Previous literature has highlighted that the effectiveness
of the board of directors is mirrored by the directors' quality
(Almeida, 2009). Therefore, the quality of the board is a cor-
porate governance mechanism that aligns to the objectives of
corporate wealth maximization (Denis & McConnell, 2003;
Jensen & Meckling, 1976) which might moderate the family
aversion to dilute control. Therefore, greater board quality
will inversely moderate the effect of family ownership on
leverage, leading to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 Board quality inversely moderates the
effect of family ownership on leverage.
2.2.2 | Gender diversity
The economic benefits from gender diversity on boards of
directors have been highlighted and explained through
agency, resource dependence and human capital theories
(Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009). In terms of these
theories, it has been argued that the presence of female
directors on the board increases the set of information
and debate on decision-making (Francoeur, Labelle, &
Sinclair-Desgagné, 2008); increases transparency through
public disclosure (Gul, Srinidhi, & Ng, 2011); improves
managerial monitoring which consequently impacts on
financial performance and earnings quality (Sarhan,
Ntim, & Al-Najjar, 2019; Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2011);
and, increases market penetration as a result of greater
understanding of the diverse range of customers and
employees (Brammer, Millington, & Rayton, 2007; Camp-
bell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008). These benefits are more rele-
vant in countries where external corporate governance
mechanisms are less developed and shareholders' protec-
tion is weak (Chong & Lopez de Silanes, 2007). In this
setting, gender is significant for corporate decisions
because a more diverse board is a better monitor of man-
agement and less likely to undermine the interest of
shareholders (Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003). Gender
diversity on boards decreases the likelihood of value-
destroying decisions made by overconfident directors
(Huang & Kisgen, 2013) and drives growth by influencing
the amount of capital to be allocated for investment
opportunities at the time of an IPO (Badru, Ahmad-
Zaluki, & Wan-Hussin, 2019). Therefore, since corporate
decisions are made in the best interests of shareholders
and female intervention has been found to positively
moderate such decisions, it could be expected that the
female directors on the board would improve the targets
of financing to align them to those that bring the largest
benefit. This effect is of particular importance in family
firms because leverage levels may be influenced from
ownership and compensation incentives (Berger, Ofek, &
Yermack, 1997; Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003),
encouraging family firms to prefer more leverage than
optimal with the aim of protecting their undiversified
wealth and reducing any prospect of a takeover (Harris &
Raviv, 1988; Stulz, 1988).
Considering that the presence of independent directors
is associated with a reduction of blockholder appropriation
(Grosman, Aguilera, & Wright, 2019) and in light of the
SEW framework of family firms, the roles of female direc-
tors differ accordingly to their involvement in the family
objectives, distinguishing the benefits of independent and
family-related female directors for board effectiveness (Pole-
tti-Hughes & Briano-Turrent, 2019). As the attributes of
female directors are relevant in exploring corporate strategic
decisions (Bennouri, Chtioui, Nagati, & Nekhili, 2018) and
the characteristics, qualifications and affiliations that these
directors bring to the boardroom differ according to
whether female directors are family-affiliated or indepen-
dent (Ruigrok, Peck, & Tacheva, 2007), ceteris paribus their
moderating impact on the relationship between family-con-
trollers and leverage would differ. That is, supporting the
interests of the controlling family through monitoring man-
agement vs. identifying effective actions to maximize value.
Therefore, in family-controlled firms, independent
female directors are more likely to mediate leverage
decisions; whereas non-independent female directors
(family-affiliated) may align financing decisions to those
of the family to preserve family ownership as explained
by the SEW theory (Berrone, Cruz, & Gómez-Mejía, 2012).
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This rationale is in line with Saeed, Mukkaram, and Bel-
ghitar (2019), who argue that the influence of board gender
diversity on corporate outcomes develops according to con-
textual features, recognizing the importance of distinct insti-
tutional pressures (i.e., socio-cultural norms).
Based on the above discussion, leverage might be
moderated by gender diversity on boards. The higher the
family engagement is, the higher the likelihood of the
family to pursuing its own goals resulting on an
entrenchment effect accrued as private benefits of control
at the expense of minority investors (Claessens, Djankov,
Fan, & Lang, 2002). However, a gender diverse board
would act as a corporate governance mechanism in mod-
erating such agency problem, but for family-controlled
firms, the significance of its impact would depend on
whether the female director is independent or not, lead-
ing to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4a Board gender diversity inversely moder-
ates the effect of family ownership on leverage.
Hypothesis 4b In family-controlled firms, independent
female directors are more effective in moderating
the relationship of family ownership on leverage.
3 | METHODS
3.1 | Data and sample
Data on the board of directors' characteristics were gathered
from Boardex and corresponds to all the available informa-
tion of directors on boards for non-financial firms from
Latin American countries with more than one firm avail-
able over the period of 2005–2016 (4,153 directors/18,767
observations). At a firm level, this data results in an unbal-
anced sample of 261 firms/ 1,553 observations. Data on the
shares held by the family and firm's age were obtained
manually from each firm's financial report and official
website for each year. We match these firms with financial
and market information available from DataStream, which
reduces our sample to 187 firms/1,108 observations: Argen-
tina (13), Brazil (91), Chile (19), Colombia (10), Mexico (49)
and Peru (5). The number of companies included is signifi-
cant to the size of the markets and is in line with other
studies from the same region (Husted & de Sousa-
Filho, 2019; Poletti-Hughes & Briano-Turrent, 2019).
3.2 | Model and variables
Following Flannery and Rangan (2006), we develop a
partial adjustment model of leverage, where β1 represents
the adjustment coefficient, ranging from zero to one. A
value of one would only happen in a perfect market and
means that the business is totally adjusted to its target
leverage. Our baseline model to test Hypothesis 1 is
expressed in Equation 1:
Leverageit = β0 + β1Leveragei,t−1 + β2Family controli,t
+φControli,t +Country j + Industry j + ηi
+ ui + εi,t
ð1Þ
Our main dependent variable is Leverageit defined by
the book value of long-term debt to total assets. In this
study, we implement multiple criteria to identify family
firms. Following Khan, Muttakin, and Siddiqui (2015),
Family controli, t is a dummy variable that takes value of
one when at least 20% of the shares are controlled by a
family (La Porta et al., 1999) and there is at least one family
member who serves on the board as director, CEO or chair-
man. To determine whether family members are involved
in the firm, we identify the founder for each of our compa-
nies from annual reports and establish whether the founder
or his/her descendants are the CEO, Chairman or director
of the board (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). We include in the
model several control variables previously used in the litera-
ture (Flannery & Rangan, 2006; Keasey et al., 2015;
Korajczyk & Levy, 2003; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Sizei, t is
the log of total assets. Tangibilityi, t is measured by fixed
assets to total assets. Roait represents return on assets,
defined as net income to total assets. Market_to_booki, t is
the sum of market value of equity and book value of total
debt divided by total assets. We also include Volatilityi, t,
which is the volatility of returns and Agei, t which is the log
of firm's age.
To test for the non-linear relationship between family
control and leverage, as stated in Hypothesis 2, we intro-
duce a continuous variable and its square. This model is
expressed in Equation 2:
Leverageit = β0 + β1Leveragei,t−1 + β2Family sharei,t
+ β3Family sharei,t
2 +φControli,t +Country j
+ Industry j + ηi + ui + εi,t
ð2Þ
Family sharei, t is a continuous variable that repre-
sents the percentage of firm's shares held by a family. As
robustness, we also include a second restrictive defini-
tion, Family controli, t that represents the family
shareholdings only for companies where the family has
effective control over the firm, that is, when Family con-
troli, t takes value of 1.
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Parting from Equation 2, we develop the following
model to test Hypotheses 3 and 4:
Leverageit = β0 + β1Leveragei,t−1
+ Family sharei,t  β2 + β3 moderatori,tð Þ
+ Family sharei,t
2  β4 + β5 moderatori,tð Þ
+ β6moderatori,t +φControli,t +Country j
+ Industry j + ηi + ui + εi,t
ð3Þ
For Hypothesis 3, moderatori, t is a variable that
accounts for board quality, measured by board experience
or expertise. These variables are obtained from a factor
analysis explained in Appendix A. For Hypothesis 4a,
moderatori, t is the ratio of the number of female directors
on the board to total number of directors. This variable
represents gender diversity of the board which increases
in line with the increase of female directors. For Hypoth-
esis 4b, moderatori, t can be the number of independent
females to total number of directors; or the number of
dependent females to total number of directors in the
board.
We estimate the model by using a dynamic general-
ized method of moments (system GMM) to deal with
endogeneity problems resulting from unobservable het-
erogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity (Khan
et al., 2019). The latter requires the inclusion of the
lagged dependent variable to account for the possibility
that contemporaneous ratios of female directors on the
board are a function of past leverage (Wintoki, Linck, &
Netter, 2012). System GMM enables to control for the
individual effect (ηi) and for time heterogeneity (ui). The
second-order serial correlation tests (m2) indicates the
absence of correlation between the residuals in first dif-
ferences. The Hansen test indicates the absence of corre-
lation between the instruments and the random
disturbance. We present Wald tests under the null
hypothesis of no joint significance of the explanatory var-
iables (z1), the time dummy variables (z2), the country
dummy variables (z3) and industry dummy vari-
ables (z4).
4 | RESULTS
Table 1 contains the main statistics of the variables
included in the model and the correlation matrix. We
find that on average families hold 31% of the companies'
shares, the leverage ratio is 23% and boards have an aver-
age of 6% of female directors. As we can observe from the
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variables are not very high. Furthermore, the variance
impact factor is lower than 5 for all the explanatory vari-
ables, so the existence of multi-collinearity problems in
our model is unlikely.
In Table 2 we present the differences of means of the
main variables between family-controlled (45.04% of the
observations) and non-family-controlled firms (54.96% of
the observations). We find that family-controlled businesses
have more leverage. This is in line with our theoretical argu-
ments that establish that family firms are usually more
attached to the business given their SEW and have greater
motivation to finance with debt. We also find that
family-controlled firms are older and have less growth
opportunities, measured by the market to book ratio than
non-family-controlled firms. With regards to the quality of
the board, boards in family-controlled firms have lower
expertise but higher experience. Finally, we observe that
while there is no significant difference with regards to their
gender diversity, when we split female directors by depen-
dent and independent, family-controlled companies have
more dependent but less independent female directors than
non-family-controlled firms. Although, the ratios of female
directors on boards are low, the percentage of companies
with female directors at any time period are higher, which
stand at 58.3% and 27.8% of the total of companies in our
sample (i.e., 187) for female directors and independent
female directors, respectively.
In Column 1 of Table 3, we obtain the results for
Hypothesis 1 and find that the effect of family control on
leverage is positive (0.051). Thus, we find support for H1
which establishes that family firms are less willing to
dilute their ownership and prefer increasing their debt
financing. In Column 2 we test Hypothesis 2, including
the shares held by the family and its square. We find that
while family owners have preference for debt at lower
levels of ownership (0.269), for higher levels they change
their aversion to issue equity to optimize the firm's lever-
age level (−0.210). That is, family owners increase lever-
age until they reach 64% of shares, and beyond this
threshold they reduce it. In Column 3 we obtain the same
results when we change the family's shares by the shares
held only when the family has significant control over
the business, with an inflection point of 89%.
Regarding the control variables, we find that leverage is
positively related to size and Roa, since larger and more
profitable firms are better able to obtain debt. Tangibility
also increases leverage because companies with more tangi-
ble assets can use them as collateral and reach higher debt.
Market_to_book is used as a proxy for investment opportu-
nities and is negatively related to leverage, since companies
with more opportunities to invest are more willing to issue
equity. Finally, we find that more volatile and older compa-
nies are less leveraged. More volatile firms may find debt
financing more costly, and firms in a younger life cycle
stage may prefer to retain control and finance their invest-
ments with debt. In general, the sign and significance of the
control variables remain unchanged for all the analyses.We
test Hypothesis 3 in Table 4. We consider two measures of
board quality, board experience and board expertise. The
former includes the average age, time in the company and
time in the board of all board members in a given company
and year. Board expertise includes the average number of
qualifications, directors who serve on other quoted boards
and network size of all board members in a given company
TABLE 2 Differences of means tests
All firms Family-controlled Non–family-controlled t-statistic
No. Obs. 1,108 499 609
Leverageit 0.23 0.25 0.22 −3.13***
Board experienceit 20.75 22.88 19.00 −15.79***
Board expertiseit 4.92 4.86 4.98 2.19**
Female directorsit 0.06 0.06 0.06 −0.47
Female independent directorsit 0.02 0.01 0.02 5.24***
Female dependent directorsit 0.04 0.05 0.03 −3.98***
Sizeit 14.95 14.91 14.99 0.74
Tangibilityit 0.37 0.38 0.37 −0.85
Roait 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.67
Market_to_bookit 1.42 1.34 1.50 1.93*
Volatilityit 0.10 0.10 0.09 −1.43
Ageit 3.52 3.61 3.44 −3.25***
Note: *** and * denote coefficients that are significant at the 1 and 10% levels, respectively.
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and year. These variables are defined in detail in Appen-
dix A. In columns 1 to 3 we use board experience, while
board expertise is considered in columns 4 to 6. In Col-
umn 1 we observe that the positive effect of family own-
ership on leverage (0.191) is reduced when the firm has a
more experience board (0.185 = 0.191–0.006). In Column
2 we account for the non-monotonic effect of family
ownership on leverage and the moderating role of board
experience. We find that an experienced board lowers the
motivation of family owners to increase leverage when
they present lower levels of ownership (0.463 = 0.4777–
0.014). In addition, for higher levels of ownership the
conservative tendency of the family to reduce leverage is
also balanced by an experience board who aims to find
TABLE 3 H1 and H2 family control and leverage



























































Inflection point 64% 89%
z1 896.19 (8) 761.52 (9) 1,302.47 (9)
z2 7.12 (10) 8.09 (10) 8.33 (10)
z3 11.49 (5) 30.07 (5) 17.19 (5)
z4 4.91 (8) 12.20 (8) 5.22 (8)
m2 (p-value) (.822) (.920) (.842)
Hansen (p-value) (.218) (.463) (.402)
Note: This table presents the coefficients (robust standard deviations) of the variables of the models, estimated by the system GMM. The
dependent variable is leverage. Time, country and sector dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors are in parenthesis. z1, z2, z3
and z4 are Wald tests of the joint significance of the explanatory variables, the time, country and sector dummies, respectively, under the null
of no relation, with the degrees of freedom in parenthesis. m2 is a second-order serial correlation test using residuals in first differences,
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically
distributed as χ2 under the null of no correlation between the instruments and the error term. ***, ** and * denote coefficients that are signif-
icant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
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the optimum financing level (−0.342 = −0.351 + 0.009).
Therefore, board quality inversely moderates the relation-
ship of family ownership and leverage, supporting
Hypothesis 3. We obtain the same results when we con-
sider board expertise in the model (columns 4 and 5). In
columns 3 and 6 we substitute the variable family share
TABLE 4 H3 family control, board quality and leverage





















































































































































z1 790.66 (10) 3,108.90(12) 5,142.09(12) 1,621.67(10) 3,503.15(12) 10,369.45(12)
z2 13.06 (10) 51.47 (10) 40.00 (10) 20.66 (10) 58.54 (10) 49.20 (10)
z3 11.66 (5) 31.66 (5) 26.87 (5) 21.90 (5) 55.42 (5) 28.82 (5)
z4 10.89 (8) 13.98 (8) 11.02 (8) 8.20 (8) 28.71 (8) 9.50 (8)
m2 (p-value) (0.872) (0.889) (0.896) (0.857) (0.898) (0.800)
Hansen (p-value) (0.716) (0.639) (0.747) (0.735) (0.548) (0.657)
Note: This table presents the coefficients (robust standard deviations) of the variables of the models, estimated by the system GMM. The
dependent variable is leverage. Time, country and sector dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors are in parenthesis. z1, z2, z3
and z4 which are Wald tests of joint significance, m2 and Hansen test are explained in Table 3. ***, ** and * denote coefficients that are signif-
icant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
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by family control, for the model with board experience
and board expertise, respectively. While we do not find a
quadratic effect for board experience, the non-monotonic
relationship is supported for board expertise. To investi-
gate further, we measure the individual impact of
each of the six board characteristics independently in
Table 5 and find that time in company, time in board,
qualifications, and number of quoted boards support
Hypothesis 3.
In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 we present the results to
test Hypothesis 4a and find support for this hypothesis since
when the representation of female directors increases, the
effect of family control on leverage is moderated by
female directors for lower levels of family ownership
(0.245 = 0.249–0.004) and higher levels of ownership
(−0.179 = −0.182 + 0.003). In columns 3 and 6 we find sup-
port for Hypothesis 4b. When the firm is controlled by the
family, independent female directors inversely moderate the
TABLE 5 Robustness H3 family control, board quality and leverage



































































































































































z1 2,268.37(12) 5,345.83(12) 6,578.14(12) 2,675.47(12) 5,112.58(12) 3,229.88(12)
z2 53.29 (10) 31.10 (10) 23.64 (10) 38.47 (10) 39.47 (10) 41.48 (10)
z3 29.38 (5) 24.74 (5) 14.57 (5) 31.11 (5) 59.83 (5) 77.91 (5)
z4 25.89 (8) 15.94 (8) 19.85 (8) 19.50 (8) 36.88 (8) 21.31 (8)
m2 (p-value) (0.962) (0.894) (0.900) (0.926) (0.895) (0.898)
Hansen (p-value) (0.498) (0.762) (0.587) (0.402) (0.583) (0.395)
Note: This table presents the coefficients (robust standard deviations) of the variables of the models, estimated by the system GMM. The
dependent variable is leverage. Time, country and sector dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors are in parenthesis. z1, z2, z3
and z4, which are Wald tests of joint significance, m2 and Hansen test are explained in Table 3. ***, ** and * denote coefficients that are sig-
nificant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
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relationship between family owners and leverage, whereas
dependent-female directors seem to increase the effect of the
family control on leverage acting on the interests of the
family firm. Therefore, independent female directors balance
the power of the family to control the firm's financing deci-
sions. However, when females are insiders (dependent), they
TABLE 6 H4 family control, female directors and leverage

































































































































































z1 1,079.71(10) 3,231.22(12) 2,755.92(12) 2,323.02(12) 11,997(12) 5,28.69(12)
z2 16.07 (10) 29.89 (10) 51.96 (10) 26.38 (10) 42.22 (10) 86.21 (10)
z3 19.05 (5) 59.50 (5) 20.04 (5) 36.84 (5) 53.99 (5) 48.80 (5)
z4 8.16 (8) 18.13 (8) 68.14 (8) 23.65 (8) 33.56 (8) 15.12 (8)
m2 (p-value) (.856) (.898) (.903) (.834) (.906) (.789)
Hansen (p-value) (.802) (.849) (.656) (.663) (.904) (.743)
Note: This table presents the coefficients (robust standard deviations) of the variables of the models, estimated by the system GMM. The
dependent variable is leverage. Time, country and sector dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors are in parenthesis. z1, z2, z3
and z4 which are Wald tests of joint significance, m2 and Hansen test are explained in Table 3. ***, ** and * denote coefficients that are signif-
icant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
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collude with the family in decision-making.Finally, to test
the robustness of the results two additional tests are run.
First, we build our dependent variable, leverage, by the
long-term debt divided by total capital. Second, we include
as control variables board size, which is measured by the
number of directors in the board; and board independence,
measured by the number of non-executive directors to total
number of directors in the board. Additionally, we repeat all
the regressions by winsorizing all continuous variables of
financial data to deal with the presence of outliers (Bharath
& Shumway, 2008). Overall, the results support our hypoth-
eses and are available from the authors upon request.
5 | DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSION
Corporate governance research has suggested that the board
of directors is an effective internal mechanism to safeguard
the interests of all shareholders in support of firms to realize
their intended outcomes (Adams et al., 2010; Dominguez-
Martinez et al., 2008; Ferrero-Ferrero et al., 2012; Kroll
et al., 2008; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Therefore, by consider-
ing that corporate governance is a system of interdependent
elements that complement (undermine) each other
(Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008) and that cul-
ture and traditions influence the behaviour of family firms
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007), we consider agency theory
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and resource dependence theory
(Hillman et al., 2009) to study the moderating effect of the
board of directors on family firms when making financing
decisions. In particular, the central premise of this frame-
work in the context of family firms is that family-controllers
have non-economic aims different from the purely economic
ones of other shareholders, which might exacerbate the ben-
efits of control (i.e., expropriation of resources from minority
investors). From the agency and SEW theory perspective,
our argument is that family firms avoid diluting control to
preserve their SEW and consequently increase debt. In such
scenario, family owners become risk-seeking and the optimal
financing decision (i.e., debt vs. equity) might be bias
towards increasing leverage despite of the risk of financial
distress (Céspedes, González, & Molina, 2010; Romano,
Tanewski, & Smyrnios, 2001). Our first hypothesis (H1) sup-
ports that family firms take more leverage. This finding is in
line with the argument that family firms are loss adverse
(Croci et al., 2011; Keasey et al., 2015) because of their partic-
ular aim to preserve the family entity for future generations
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007), highlighting that financing deci-
sions might be biased towards such family aim. This behav-
iour is particularly relevant in the Latin American setting
where, family control is common and the strength of family
tradition prevails as a rational means to safeguard a firm's
resources by passing them on to future generations. This
encourages family firms to willingly influence firm's strategic
decisions with a non-financial objective despite increasing
the risk of low target performance (Poletti-Hughes & Wil-
liams, 2019). From the SEW perspective, we find that family
owners change their attitude towards risk based on the
frame of problems. They are willing to reduce leverage when
their SEW objectives have been achieved (gain frame) and
take conservative decisions that reduce the level of debt
financing. Therefore, we find that family owners increase
leverage when they are in a loss frame, that is, for low levels
of ownership, and reduce it when they are in a gain frame,
that is, when the family has high levels of ownership in sup-
port of H2. This is true when family control has been consid-
ered in the model. Additionally, in comparison with Anglo-
Saxon and developed countries, Latin American corporate
governance structures are less developed and investor protec-
tion is weaker (La Porta et al., 1999), influencing the dynam-
ics of boards of directors towards region-specific strategy
formulation (Brenes, Mena, & Molina, 2008).
By integrating resource dependence theory in our analy-
sis, we find that boards of directors play a critical role in
moderating leverage in family firms. We find that the qual-
ity of the board (H3) offsets the financing preferences of
family owners, corroborating our stance on directors' ability
(i.e., boards' capital as defined in Hillman & Dalziel, 2003)
which complements agency issues in explaining financing
decisions in family firms. With this in mind, we consider
the importance of directors' capital from the strategy and
service provision (Zahra & Pearce II, 1990; Zattoni, Gnan,
& Huse, 2015) and measure it with directors' experience
and expertise. In each case we confirm that directors pro-
vide valuable guidance for strategic financing decisions by
monitoring and advising management. In addition, leverage
is moderated by the proportion of female directors on
boards (H4a) because of their contribution to additional
expertise that enhances boards' advisory effectiveness
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Kim & Starks, 2016). Therefore,
the role of female directors goes beyond agency theory
(Huse & Solberg, 2006) and exposes a practical impact on
firms' outcomes, stressing that board gender diversity assist
to the pool of knowledge and skills that increases its effec-
tiveness (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). As female directors pro-
vide different and unconventional professional capabilities
and backgrounds, decision-making is enhanced (Singh, Ter-
jesen, & Vinnicombe, 2008) enabling the board to mediate
non-optimal leverage decisions. By considering, the legiti-
macy and authority that goes with the position of director
(Cruz et al., 2019), we observe differences in the role played
by female directors according to whether they are indepen-
dent or affiliated to the family controller (Poletti-Hughes &
Briano-Turrent, 2019). While independent female directors
inversely balance the family financing preferences,
POLETTI-HUGHES AND MARTÍNEZ GARCIA 13
dependent females collude with the family interests. In this
context, family control intensifies firms' structural forces
and influences self-compliance of dependent-female direc-
tors to adhere to the family interests (Boulouta, 2013).
Our study has relied on robust techniques of analysis
(i.e., system GMM) by considering that the characteristics
of boards of directors are endogenously related to the
firm (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) because governance
structures are selected in response to governance issues
that firms face (Adams et al., 2010).
6 | PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
The implication of our study for practitioners is clear, the
composition of boards of directors is directly concerned
to their effectiveness (Baysinger & Butler, 1985) but more
importantly different kinds of boards are required in dif-
ferent situations to optimize financing decisions (e.g.,
family firms in Latin America).
From a theoretical point of view, we propose that
level of the family's SEW, measured by their family own-
ership, explain their leverage preferences. In addition, we
propose that both theories, agency theory and resource
dependence theory, are needed to understand the role
played by the board of directors in the decision-making
process of family firms, and particularly, their financing
decisions. Therefore, it is important having efficient
boards that do not only serve their role as controllers, as
explained by the agency theory, but also offer experience
and expertise that help to properly assist the manage-
ment on behalf of firm's value maximization.
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APPENDIX A.: Principal factor analysis and
board quality
Board quality is gauged by six board characteristics. First
is qualifications, which is measured by the total number
of academic and professional qualifications divided by
total number of directors. The baseline of qualifications is
one, representing either a graduate degree or less. A unit
is added for each additional qualification. Second is the
average age of the directors in the board. Third is the
average of number of quoted boards that directors have
been to the current date. Fourth, the board network mea-
sured by the log of the number of individuals that are
connected to all directors in the board (e.g., through
studying or working together at some point) divided by
the total number of directors in the board. Fifth, the
board average of number of years that directors have
been in the company. Finally, the board average of num-
ber of years that directors have been in the board.
The results for the extraction of component factors
can be found in Table A1. We obtain two factors that
account for almost 67.18% of the variance. We rotate the
first matrix using an orthogonal varimax rotation
method, but we also use as robustness tests other rotation
methods such as quartimax, equamax and parsimax, and
the results remain the same. In Table A2, we can see the
factor loadings of the unrotated factor matrix and the
orthogonal varimax matrix, and the communalities of
each variable. The communalities, which is the
Uniqueness – 1, gives the proportion of variance that
each variable remains after the factor extraction. The var-
iables with less communalities are qualifications and
average age, but still with acceptable levels. We consider
those loadings that are practically significant, this is,
equal or greater than ±0.50. Following these criteria, we
do not find problems such as: a variable has no practical
significant loadings, a variable's communality is deemed
too low, or a variable has cross-loading, this is, significant
loadings for more than one factor.
Therefore, Factor 1 is positively associated with aver-
age age, time in company and time in board, which repre-
sents the board's experience. While Factor 2 is positively
associated with qualifications, quoted boards to date and
network size, this factor represents the board's expertise.
All test including the correlation matrix, the Bartlett test
of sphericity, the Kaiser Meyer Olkin test, and the anti-image
correlation matrix are satisfactory, so we can conclude all
these variables can be introduced in the factor analysis.
Finally, we assess the validity, dimensionality and reliability
of the two factors we have obtained. We randomly split the
sample and do the analysis for both samples. Interpretations
of the results are the same, which proves the validity of the
analysis. The dimensionality of each factor is supported
given that each variable has a high loading only in one fac-
tor. In terms of reliability or internal consistency of the fac-
tors, the item to total correlation and inter-item correlation
are satisfactory and the Cronbach's alpha for the first and
second factor are 0.81 and 0.57, respectively.
TABLE A1 Results for the
extraction of component factors
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor 1 2.38662 0.74254 0.3978 0.3978
Factor 2 1.64408 0.82881 0.2740 0.6718
Factor 3 0.81527 0.15298 0.1359 0.8077
Factor 4 0.66229 0.23159 0.1104 0.9180
Factor 5 0.43070 0.36965 0.0718 0.9898
Factor 6 0.06105 - 0.0102 1.0000
TABLE A2 Factor loadings of the unrotated factor matrix and the orthogonal varimax matrix, and the communalities of each variable
Unrotated loadings Varimax rotated loadings
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness
Qualifications −0.3080 0.5912 −0.3604 0.5608 0.5557
Average age 0.6408 −0.0381 0.6416 0.0202 0.5879
Quoted to date 0.3519 0.7358 0.2836 0.7647 0.3348
Network 0.0498 0.8640 −0.0288 0.8650 0.2510
Time in company 0.9260 −0.0449 0.9263 0.0394 0.1404
Time in board 0.9472 −0.0569 0.9485 0.0294 0.0995
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